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Evolution of cooperation is a widely studied problem in biology, social science, economics and
artificial intelligence. Most of the existing approaches that explain cooperation rely on some notion
of direct or indirect reciprocity. These reciprocity based models assume agents recognize their
partner and know their previous interactions, which requires advanced cognitive abilities. In this
paper we are interested in developing a model that produces cooperation without requiring any
explicit memory of previous game plays. Our model is based on the notion of inequity aversion,
a concept introduced within behavioral economics, whereby individuals care about payoff equality
in outcomes. Here we explore the effect of using income inequality to guide partner selection and
interaction. We study our model by considering both the well-mixed and the spatially structured
population and present the conditions under which cooperation becomes dominant. Our results
support the hypothesis that inequity aversion promotes cooperative relationship among non kin.
I. INTRODUCTION
The evolution of cooperative behavior among seem-
ingly competing organisms presents a challenge to the
theory of natural selection [1]. An action that benefits
others and comes at a cost to oneself should eventually
disappear. On the contrary, there are numerous biolog-
ical and social settings in animal and human societies
where cooperation is ubiquitous [7, 21, 29]. Evolutionary
game theory (EGT) [18, 30] provides a simple framework
to study this puzzle. In each generation agents play a
finite number of games and receive reward according to
a specified payoff matrix, usually the prisoner’s dilemma
game [26]. At the end of each generation, players are
reproduced proportional to their relative fitness, subject
to mutation. Thus EGT mimics natural selection by in-
creasing the relative abundance of better performing (in
terms of accumulated reward) individuals.
The prisoner’s dilemma (PD) is one of the most
widely used games to study the evolution of cooperation
[2, 6, 8, 10]. PD is a simultaneous two player game where
each player decides whether to cooperate (C) or defect
(D). Mutual cooperation gives higher payoff than mutual
defection. But if one player cooperates the other player
is better off defecting. Thus each player has an incen-
tive to “free ride” at a cost to the cooperative player. In
the absence of any special mechanism defecting players
would outperform cooperative players and (by natural
selection) become dominant [22]. The game serves as a
metaphor for various real-world settings where there is a
conflict between individual and group interest [14].
Although many solutions have been put forth to re-
solve this puzzle, most of these models rely on some no-
tion of direct or indirect reciprocity. In direct reciprocity
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[19, 35] agents interact repeatedly, and after each inter-
action they update their response based on how cooper-
ative (kind) or non cooperative (unkind) the other agent
was. Indirect reciprocity [17, 20, 24] relies on the notion
that individuals are kind to those who are kind to oth-
ers. Both models assume agents recognize their partner
and know their previous interactions. In large dynamic
settings such an assumption would require advanced cog-
nitive abilities.
Approaches that do not require reciprocity include kin
selection and group selection models. In kin selection
[13, 33] agents are favorably biased towards their genetic
relatives. It requires agents to differentiate between kin
and non-kin agents and does not explain cooperative out-
comes observed in unrelated individuals. Group selection
[34, 36] addresses these issues by proposing that selection
works not only on individuals but also on groups. Agents
form groups and cooperate with other agents in the same
group.
An interesting addition to the above reciprocity-free
models of cooperation is the tag-mediated partner selec-
tion [27, 28]. Tags are simple observable traits or cultural
artifacts which agents use to favorably bias their inter-
actions with agents having similar tags. Experimental
results [27] show that a tag based model can produce sta-
ble cooperation even in single round prisoner’s dilemma
game.
In this paper, we are interested in developing a model
of cooperation that does not require an agent’s type or
its past interaction to be known explicitly. Our model
is based on the notion that individuals are averse to in-
come inequalities. This concept has been formalized and
widely studied within behavioral economics as inequity
aversion [9]. It was introduced to account for outcome
anomalies between experimental results and theoretical
models. In the inequity aversion model, as proposed by
Fehr and Schmidt [9], individuals enforce income equal-
ity by forgoing monetary payoff. If the material payoffs
of players i, j are xi, xj , respectively, the experienced
2utility (which players maximize) of player i is given by
Ui(xi, xj) = xi−k1 ·max(xj−xi, 0)−k2 ·max(xi−xj , 0)
where k1 < k2 and 0 ≤ k2 ≤ 1 are inequity aversion sen-
sitivity parameters. It follows from the above equation
that the experienced utility is maximized when inequity
is zero. The condition k1 < k2 implies that the decrease
in a player’s utility is higher when it is behind (in terms
of payoff) than when it is ahead. Fehr and Schmidt [9]
show that the above model can account for cooperation
observed in various human interactions.
Here we study the effect of using the social paradigm
of inequity aversion as a criterion for partner selection.
Instead of defining experienced utility we simply allow
agents to use accumulated payoff to select their game
partner. Thus inequity aversion in our context implies
that agents avoid interacting with other agents whose
accumulated payoff is higher or lower than their own pay-
off. Our experimental results show that cooperation can
emerge even if individuals receive only rudimentary envi-
ronmental signals about others’ well-being (and not their
type or specific behavior). It supports the hypotheses
that inequity aversion promotes cooperation among non
kin [4]. We also observe a strong correlation between co-
operation and inequity aversion that indicates a possible
coevolution of these two behaviors [4].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We first
present the model and define the partner selection bias
as a function of income inequality. We then evaluate
the model by considering both the well-mixed and the
spatially structured population and highlight the evolu-
tionary dynamics of cooperation and inequity aversion.
We also study the effects of various parameters on the
fraction of cooperative players in the environment and
then conclude.
II. MODEL
In this section we first introduce the general model
where agents interact in a well-mixed population. We
later present the model with spatial constraints.
Agents. The model consists of a fixed number of agents
N . Each agent is either the cooperative or defecting type.
The cooperative type always plays cooperate, and the de-
fecting type always plays defect. Agents have an associ-
ated parameter λ which gives a measure of how sensitive
or tolerant they are to payoff inequality. A player’s type
and sensitivity parameter are subjected to evolutionary
changes (see evolutionary step below). Players also have
an accumulated reward which is initialized to zero at the
start of each generation and updated according to the
payoff received in each game.
Payoff matrix. The payoff received by each player is
specified by the standard prisoner’s dilemma game:
(
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FIG. 1. P(i, j) for different values of rj and λi = {5, 1, 0.5}
when ri = 0 and λj = 0.
Cooperative players provide benefit b to their oppo-
nent and incur a cost c (b > c > 0). Defecting players
neither provide benefit nor incur any cost. Given the
payoff structure, the dominant strategy for each player,
irrespective of what the other player does, is to defect.
Thus players end up with a payoff of zero instead of the
mutually beneficial payoff b − c. This characterizes
the dilemma between individual interest and group well-
being. Without loss of generality, we use the following
normalized payoff matrix:
(
1 0
1 + c/b c/b
)
.
This allows us to study the game as a function of a
single cost-to-benefit parameter, 0 < c/b < 1 [11, 16].
Partner selection and interaction. In each generation,
agents are selected sequentially (random order) and play
a single round of the prisoner’s dilemma game. Players
use their accumulated payoff and sensitivity parameter to
determine their game partner. The search space variable
Ns ∈ N gives the subset of agents from which players
choose their partner. Denote ri, rj as the accumulated
payoff and λi, λj as the sensitivity parameters of players
i, j, respectively. The probability that player i would
accept player j is given by
φ(i, j) = e−λi|ri−rj|.
Given the search space Ns, player i selects player
j such that the above probability is maximized, j =
argmaxj∈Ns φ(i, j). We similarly define φ(j, i) as the
probability that player j would accept player i as its part-
ner. The probability of interaction between players i and
j is given by
P(i, j) = φ(i, j)φ(j, i)
= e−(λi+λj)|ri−rj |. (1)
The interaction is bilateral or with mutual consent
since the probability of interaction depends on both play-
ers’ sensitivity parameters. We set the range of the sen-
sitivity parameter λ ∈ [0, 5]. If λi = λj = 0, players are
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FIG. 2. (a) The fraction of cooperative players fc across generations for a typical run for N = 250, Ns = 8, and c/b = 0.45.
(b) The corresponding average λ value of cooperative players. (c) The corresponding number of games with C-C, C-D, and
D-D interactions vs λ.
indifferent to inequity, and as λ increases, they become
increasingly inequity averse. The upper limit of 5 ensures
that the probability P(i, j) is close to zero, even for small
payoff differences. To illustrate, Figure. 1 gives the prob-
ability of interaction between players i and j for different
values of λi when i’s accumulated reward ri = 0 and
λj = 0. For rj = 1 and λi = 0.5, the probability of in-
teraction P(i, j) = 0.6 which decreases to P(i, j) = 0.006
for λi = 5.
Once the partner is selected, the PD game is played
with the probability given in Equation. (1). If both play-
ers are cooperative, their accumulated payoff increases
by 1. If only one of the players is cooperative, the de-
fecting player’s accumulated payoff increases by 1 + c/b,
and the cooperative player’s accumulated payoff remains
unchanged.
We note that, unlike tag-mediated models of cooper-
ation [27] where an agent’s tags remain fixed in a given
generation, in our model the accumulated payoff serves
as a dynamic tag which changes after each interaction.
Evolutionary step. At the end of each generation
agents are reproduced using the binary tournament pro-
cedure [12, 31]:
(1) Two distinct agents are randomly selected for a tour-
nament, and the agent with the higher fitness value is
declared the winner (we use the accumulated reward
as the fitness value).
(2) A copy of the winner, called the offspring, is added
to the new generation and the above procedure is re-
peated N times.
Additionally, a mutation is applied to each offspring.
The mutation value gives the probability with which the
offspring’s type is randomly reset to either the cooper-
ative or defecting type. Since the sensitivity parameter
is a continuous variable, we apply mutation by adding,
with probability µ, Gaussian noise with mean 0 and de-
viation 1 to the inherited λ value [28]. The accumulated
reward of the offspring is set to zero. The algorithm in
Table 1 provides the pseudo code of the model.
Algorithm 1 Algorithm for agent interaction
Require: µ,N,Ns.
while generation g ≤ gmax do
for all agents i ∈ N do
select Ns ∈ N agents randomly
j = argmaxj∈Ns φ(i, j)
With Probability P(i, j), Play(i, j)
Update accumulated payoff ri, rj
end for
New Set Of Players N = EvolutionaryStep(N , µ)
end while
III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We recall that N is the number of agents, Ns is the
search space, and c/b is the cost-to-benefit ratio. We
denote the fraction of cooperative players with fc. C-C
denotes the cooperative-cooperative player interaction.
We similarly define C-D and D-D interactions. For all
experiments, we set µ = 0.1 and initialize λ to a uniform
value between [0, 5]. The initial fraction of cooperative
players is set to 10%. We report the results by averaging
across 20 runs, with each run consisting of 15000 gener-
ations. Our results cover the following aspects: (1) the
evolutionary dynamics of fc, λ, and the correlation be-
tween them, (2) the change in the fraction of games with
C-C, C-D, and D-D interactions as λ value changes, (3)
the effect of number of agents and search space on fc as
the cost-to-benefit ratio c/b increases, and (4) the effect
of spatial constraints on fc.
A. Mixed population
Figure 2(a) shows the fraction of cooperative players fc
across generations for a typical run (with N = 250, Ns =
8 and c/b = 0.45). Figure 2(b) gives the corresponding
average λ value of cooperative players. We observe high
levels of cooperation fc ≥ 0.75 interrupted by brief pe-
riods of defection. The generations when the fraction of
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FIG. 3. (a) fc vs c/b for Ns = 8 and N = {100, 200, 300}. (b) fc vs c/b for N = 150 and Ns = {6, 8, 10, 12}. (c) Color map
depicting fc on the Ns −N plane for c/b = 0.4.
cooperative players falls significantly are highlighted to
show the close correlation between fc and λ. Across all
simulations we observe that an increase or decrease in
the fraction of cooperative players is preceded by an in-
crease or decrease in the average λ value. For example,
as shown in Figures 2(a) and 2(b), from generation 7100
to 7500, the average λ value decreases gradually from 4.2
to 0.3. We see a corresponding decrease in the fc value
from 0.84 to 0.08.
At the start of each generation, as the accumulated
payoff of all players is 0, the probability of interaction
between any two players is 1, irrespective of λ. So in the
initial stages, defecting players have a slight advantage
(since the cooperative players would not reject them as
a game partner), and their accumulated payoff increases.
But after the first few games, the cooperative agents in-
volved in C-D interactions start forming temporary clus-
ters sharing a common payoff. If these cooperative play-
ers are sufficiently inequity averse, in the subsequent it-
erations, they are more likely to interact within these
clusters, and their payoff increases. The defecting players
who initially exploit the cooperative players face a form of
“social exclusion” from these groups. Thus inequity aver-
sion allows cooperative players to seek new partners and
form groups with whom they can share more equitable
payoffs. As the interactions proceed, cooperative players
that are more tolerant (small λ value) to income inequal-
ity continue to interact with defecting agents. They are
outperformed by cooperative players with relatively high
λ value and die out. Over generations the average λ of
cooperative players increases, which further reduces the
likelihood of C-D interactions until cooperation becomes
dominant.
However, this cooperation due to the temporary clus-
tering effect is not permanent. When cooperation is es-
tablished, agents have a high λ value. At this stage,
the cooperative agents with a relatively smaller λ value
have a slight advantage as they are more likely to toler-
ate inequality and play the game. And since cooperative
agents are dominant, with high probability these agents
interact with other cooperative agents, and their accu-
mulated payoff increases. The environment faces a slight
selection pressure towards higher tolerance levels (lower
λ value). As this happens gradually over generations, at
some threshold λ, agents become vulnerable to invasion
by defectors, and the cooperation levels fall sharply. The
system remains in this state until by chance, due to mu-
tation, a few cooperative players with a relatively high λ
value emerge and reestablish cooperation.
To further validate the correlation between fc and λ,
Figure 2(c) shows the number of games with C-C, C-
D, and D-D interactions as a function of λ. For a low λ
value C-D and D-D interactions dominate. As the λ value
increases, cooperative clusters emerge, and C-C becomes
dominant.
The cycles of cooperation and defection are not regu-
lar or periodic, and how often the system goes into the
defection state and how quickly it recovers depends on
the parameters N, Ns, and c/b. In general we observe
that as the cost-to-benefit ratio c/b increases or Ns de-
creases, it takes longer for the system to recover from the
defection state.
Figures 3(a) and 3(b) show the fraction of cooperative
players vs the cost-to-benefit ratio for different values of
N and Ns, respectively. Across both simulations, as c/b
increases, fc decreases, and for c/b ≥ 0.5, cooperation
disappears. With respect to N , we observe the fc value
decreases marginally for 0.3 ≤ c/b ≤ 0.5 as N decreases.
The change in fc is considerably higher with respect to
change in Ns values. As the search space increases, fc
increases. The search space affects the probability of
selecting an agent from within the temporary clusters
that emerge. A higher search space value translates to a
higher probability of interaction within the cluster. We
also observe a “thresholding” effect; that is, for a fixed
change in Ns the increase in the fc value is higher for
smaller values of Ns. Figure 3(c) shows a color map of
fc for different values of Ns (along the X axis) and N
(along the Y axis) with c/b = 0.45. For a high (Ns ≥ 12)
or low search space (Ns ≤ 4), fc does not change with
N .
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FIG. 4. (a) The fraction of cooperative players fc across generations for a typical run with N = 12 × 12 and c/b = 0.45. (b)
The corresponding average λ value of cooperative players. (c) The corresponding fraction of games (fg) within and outside the
clusters for the first few generations. (d) fc vs c/b for different grid sizes.
B. Two-dimensional lattice
We now consider the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game
[23, 32] where each player occupies a cell in a square lat-
tice. Similar to the well-mixed population model, agents
are either the cooperative or defecting type and use their
accumulated payoff to select their game partner and in-
teract. But due to spatial constraints an agent’s search
space is restricted to its four neighboring cells. We also
change the binary tournament procedure to reflect an
agent’s fixed position. For each offspring cell to be added
to the new generation, two distinct agents are randomly
selected from the neighborhood of the cell. The agent
with the higher fitness values is declared the winner and
the offspring inherits the winner’s type and λ value. Mu-
tation is applied as discussed in the previous model.
Figures 4(a) and 4(b) show the evolutionary dynam-
ics of fc and λ for a typical run with N = 12 × 12 and
c/b = 0.45 for the first 2000 generations (similar behav-
ior is seen in subsequent generations). Across all sim-
ulations, we observe that the cooperation in the spatial
prisoner’s dilemma is more “robust” (i.e., unlike the pre-
vious model where cooperation almost disappears before
recovering, here we see stable cooperation). The increase
and decrease in the fc value are marginal but are still
closely correlated with the increase and decrease in the
λ value.
While a single cooperative agent surrounded by defec-
tors is always outperformed, cooperative players that are
sufficiently inequity averse and adjacent to each other
have two advantages: (1) the temporary clustering that
arises due to sharing a common payoff and (2) the clus-
tering provided by spatial constraints. Like the previous
model, in the initial games of a generation, if coopera-
tive and defecting agents interact, the inequity in accu-
mulated payoff ensures that in the subsequent iterations
the probability of C-D interactions decreases. And as
is traditionally the case, the spatial constraint further
improves the performance of cooperative players since
players in the interior of the cluster enjoy the benefit of
mutual cooperation. Figure 4(c) shows the fraction of
interactions (for the above sample run) within and out-
side the clusters for the first few generations. The cor-
responding snapshots for the first 40 generations along
with the size of the largest cooperative cluster (given be-
low each plot) are shown in Figure. 5. Defecting players
are in black. We observe the cooperative players become
dominant by generation 32.
Figure 4(d) shows the fraction of cooperators vs c/b
for different grid sizes. We observe fc does not change
withN , and similar to the well-mixed model, cooperation
disappears for c/b ≥ 0.5.
IV. CONCLUSION
We developed a model of agent interaction that is
motivated by the social paradigm that individuals are
inequity-averse and prefer to interact with others within
the same social strata. We presented the results by con-
sidering both the well-mixed and the spatially structured
populations across different parameter values. In general,
cooperation becomes dominant when the cost of coopera-
tion is low and is more robust for a structured population.
Our results support the hypotheses that inequity aver-
sion promotes cooperation among non kin [4]. It allows
individuals to seek new partners with whom they can
share more equitable payoffs. And if the equitable pay-
off increases the relative fitness of such individuals (as is
the case with the prisoner’s dilemma), natural selection
would guarantee that inequity averse cooperative agents
emerge. We also observe a strong correlation between
inequity aversion and cooperation that points to the co-
evolution of these behaviors. Brosnan [4] provides an ex-
tensive discussion of inequity aversion observed in other
species [15, 25], including capuchin monkeys [3], which
“elucidate evolutionary precursors to inequity aversion”
[5].
We believe the model presented in this paper is an im-
portant step towards better understanding coevolution
of cooperation and inequity aversion. In the future, we
intend to evaluate the model by considering generic ran-
dom networks and to incorporate other social factors like
group membership, dominance rank, context of interac-
6FIG. 5. Snapshots for first 40 generations on 12 × 12 grid and c/b = 0.45. Defecting players are in dark. The labels give the
size of the largest cooperative cluster.
tion, etc., which have been shown to effect the overall response to inequity [4].
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